

THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1986:  
AN ANALYSIS OF AIR FORCE IMPLEMENTATION OF TITLE IV AND  
ITS IMPACT ON  
THE AIR FORCE OFFICER CORPS

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## Preface and Acknowledgments

The passing of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was a landmark event, significantly altering the way Military Services, and Congress conduct business. Yet, because of its complexity and depth, most Service members do not fully understand how the legislation affects professional military education (PME), career progression and utilization—for the law can have long-range effects on future assignments, the timing and selection of PME courses, as well as career paths for Air Force (AF) officers. Title IV was Congress' legislative attempt to improve the overall quality and coordination of joint operations by enhancing the quality and education of those officers assigned to joint positions.

Title IV of the legislation, Joint Officer Personnel Policy, is probably the most complex and least understood portion of the legislation, yet it has the most direct impact on the officer corps. After the Act's passage in 1986, Title IV became the focus of concern to the then Air Force Chief of Staff, General Larry D. Welch. In a statement to the House Armed Services Committee on 28 May 1987, General Welch asserted, "The single area requiring further discussion is Joint Officer Personnel Policy." He further stated, "Certainly, officer personnel policy is a subject worthy of our most careful attention since it heavily impacts both our ability to provide trained, equipped, disciplined forces and quality support for joint commands and organizations."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> General Larry D. Welch, chief of staff, US Air Force, "titles IV and V of Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986," address to the House Armed Services Committee Investigations Subcommittee, Washington DC, 28 May 1987.

Because of Title IV's importance to the officer corps and its complexity, our research group assumed the task of demystifying this title of the Act by providing a brief synopsis of the legislation and an analysis of its implementation and compliance/non-compliance by the AF. In concert with this effort, we analyzed the current Officer Professional Development (OPD) Program to determine its compatibility with Title IV. We believe our synopsis of Title IV's history, our status report on Air Force compliance/non-compliance, and our candid analysis and recommendations will lead to a better understanding of Title IV and its importance to the Air Force and its officer corps.

Our paper is the result of countless interviews and contacts with a myriad of personnel and agencies. We would like to extend a special thank-you to Colonel Norm Rathje, Vice Commander, Air Force Military Personnel Center (AFMPC), for his sponsorship of this important undertaking. We would also like to acknowledge the following individuals for their dedicated efforts, for whom without, this project would not have been possible: From AFMPC, we'd like to thank, Vaughn Blackstone, Assignment Procedures Advisor; Major Frank Provenzano, Chief, Military Education Branch; Captain Larry D. Hall, Chief, Joint Officer Management Branch; Captain Alfred E. Bruner, Chief, Joint Duty Assignment Management Section; Captain Donald Barnes, Recorder, Selection Board Secretariat; and Master Sergeant Beth Compton, Chief, Joint Officer Development Section. We would like to extend a special thanks to our AFMPC analyst, Captain Dave McCormick, Strategic Force Analyst, whose many hours of dedicated 'number crunching' added substance to this paper. Additionally, from the Air Staff, we'd like to thank, Lieutenant Colonel William R. Berger, Chief, Professional Programs, Education and Training Division; Lieutenant Colonel Jack Hales, Chief, Strategic Plans Unit; Lieutenant

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### **Abstract**

In 1986, Congress enacted the Department of Defense Reorganization Act, directing how Services manage joint officers, in an effort to improve the quality of joint officers and operations. This research paper analyzes AF legislative compliance in: promotions, assignments, education and joint specialty officer (JSO) designations for field grade officers. The research analyzes the initial law and subsequent amendments to establish a compliance baseline and examines AF, Joint Staff and Secretary of Defense records to assess conformity. After the compliance review, the research examines programs, policies and laws affecting compliance, followed by a study of the integration of Title IV concepts in the OPD Program. There were two non-compliance areas—promotions and JSO guidelines. First, despite a multitude of initiatives involving promotion board processes and assignments, AF failed 41 of 46 promotion categories, although significant improvement was noted. Second, there were no established JSO career guidelines and there were negative perceptions regarding joint duty in OPD. To improve compliance, this paper recommends better integration of joint concepts in OPD; the establishment of JSO guidelines; and an aggressive media effort to enhance perceptions of joint. Further, it advocates the inclusion of OPD counseling during mandatory performance feedback and the implementation of existing legislation affecting JPME outplacement. Last, it recommends revitalizing ‘cross-flow’ assignments between Air and Joint Staffs, and establishing a comprehensive data-base to enable more extensive analysis of joint management initiatives. It is the general opinion of the researchers that AF has made a

concerted effort to meet Title IV mandates and with the implementation of additional modifications or 'enhancements,' AF should be in full compliance.

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**Chapter 1: History of Goldwater-Nichols Act**

“It is broke, and we need to fix it.”<sup>1</sup> Senator Barry Goldwater spoke these words on 3 October 1985 during a Senate floor speech in reference to the Defense Department’s organization and decision-making procedures. What led to this rather harsh statement was not a recent, or single event. It was the realization that a series of mishaps and a consistent pattern of parochialism within the military, dating back as far as the Spanish-American War to the more recent bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon, the failed Desert One Iranian hostage rescue mission, and aspects of the 1983 invasion of Grenada, were cause for dire alarm and immediate action. Specifically, he cited the inability of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to provide useful and timely military advice; the poor performance in joint operations; the insufficient quality of the staff of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs; the confused command lines; and the lack of adequate advocates for joint interests in budgetary matters.<sup>2</sup>

Although more than twenty major studies and individual proposals on the reorganization of the US military were initiated since the informal inception of the JCS in 1942, none were able to fully succeed in rectifying the underlying problem, that being the lack of the integrated employment of land, sea and air forces, in other words, ‘jointness.’

After two unpopular and indecisive wars, Korea and Vietnam, and the aforementioned mishaps, then Chairman, JCS, General David C. Jones, United States Air Force (USAF), shook the foundation of joint service inter-operability by writing the article "Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change." The article criticized the JCS structure and processes including the lack of JCS control in selecting the Joint Staff (JS), Service parochialism, and unwieldy joint staffing procedures.<sup>3</sup> Shortly thereafter, General Edward C. Meyer, Chief of Staff, US Army (USA), expressed his support of General Jones' proposed reforms. Together, they were able to convince Congress that the organization of the Department of Defense (DoD), must be reassessed and that changes in operations were desperately needed if the Services were to function more effectively as a team.

What followed was a multitude of Congressional hearings, debates, and investigations. Two key investigations provided enough impetus for legislative action. The first, the Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, published the report A Quest for Excellence, which reviewed "national security planning and budgeting, military organization and command, acquisition organization and procedures, and government-industry accountability."<sup>4</sup> The second investigation produced a staff report for the Senate Armed Services Committee titled Defense Organization: The Need for Change.<sup>5</sup>

The investigations led to similar conclusions. First, the Military Services usually put their own interests ahead of joint interests. Secondly, the advice of the JCS was not valued since it resulted from the individual Service's consensus vote. Lastly, the combatant commanders had little control over subordinate commanders, the forces in their area of operations, and the defense budget.<sup>6</sup> What resulted was a war-fighting force lacking coordination and cooperation. In 1985, General John W. Vessey, Jr., USA,

described the way we should fight. He put it this way, "Joint operations is when the unique combat capabilities of two or more of the Services come together to make the whole greater than the sum of the parts in order to kick the tar out of the enemies of the United States."<sup>7</sup> What ultimately emerged as a result of the numerous studies and investigations was the Goldwater-Nichols, DoD Reorganization Act of 1986, signed by President Reagan on 1 October 1986 as Public Law (P.L.) 99-433—a piece of legislation designed to ensure our forces could 'kick the tar out of our enemies.'

In enacting Goldwater-Nichols legislation, Congress specifically stated its intent was:

- to improve the military advice provided to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense;

- to reorganize the DoD and strengthen civilian authority in the Department;

- to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands;

- ensure that the authority of the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands is fully commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of missions assigned to their commands;

- to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning;

- to improve joint officer management policies;

- to provide for more efficient use of defense resources [and]

- otherwise to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and administration of the Department of Defense.<sup>8</sup>

Achievement of Congress' intent would become the primary job of the Joint Staff, the very same organization and personnel Congress criticized as being of inadequate quality. The Joint Staff's inferior reputation was due to a combination of an unfavorable



historical pattern of promotions and assignments for officers assigned to joint tours of duty; limited joint education; and negative attitudes towards joint duty by the Services.<sup>9</sup> To improve the quality of joint officers and in turn achieve the intent of the new legislation, Congress incorporated Title IV, Joint Officer Personnel Policy, into the law. Title IV's importance in ensuring the legislation was properly implemented and administered cannot be overemphasized. It now becomes the focus of this paper.

## **Chapter 2: Title IV Synopsis**

The DoD's ability to successfully employ the nation's Armed Forces is dependent on the integration of the war-fighting capabilities of the Military Services. To effectively integrate these capabilities, DoD must produce high quality officers experienced and educated in joint matters. A Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) October 1985 report clearly stated that DoD was not succeeding in the production of such officers.<sup>10</sup>

The SASC defined quality in the following way: (1) the inherent skills and talents as professional military officers; (2) the necessary education and experience; and (3) a tour of sufficient length to become effective and to provide continuity.<sup>11</sup> Its report recommended the system of military education, training and assignments be changed to produce officers with a heightened awareness and greater commitment to DoD-wide requirements—a genuine multi-Service perspective, and an improved understanding of the other Services.<sup>12</sup> The report also recommended that a joint duty career specialty be established in each Service.<sup>13</sup> As a result of these recommendations, legislation, in the form of Title IV, was enacted to ensure DoD reorganized its professional military education establishment and revised its officer career patterns.<sup>14</sup>

Title IV's objectives were clear—it sought to improve the quality of officers assigned to joint organizations, increase the experience and educational levels of such officers, and expand the exposure of officers to joint matters.<sup>15</sup> To achieve these objectives, the Act established a category of officers known as joint specialty officers (JSO), defined their qualifying education and experience requirements, and set promotion

objectives for joint specialists and other officers assigned to joint duty. It also established minimum tour lengths for joint duty assignments (JDA) and required a JDA for promotion to general/flag officer (G/FO).<sup>16</sup>

A more detailed description of Title IV provisions follows:

Establishes an occupational category, referred to as the 'joint specialty' for the management of officers who are trained in and oriented toward joint matters

Provides that joint specialty officers (JSO) shall be selected by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) from nominees submitted by the Secretaries of the Military Departments

Requires that an officer may not be selected for the joint specialty until a program of joint education and a full joint tour are completed

Requires 50 percent of joint duty positions in grades above captain/Navy lieutenant be filled by officers who have been nominated or selected for the joint specialty

Directed the SecDef to designate at least 1,000 critical joint duty assignments (JDA) that must always be filled by JSOs

Requires the SecDef to establish career guidelines for JSOs

Requires, subject to a waiver by the SecDef, that all officers promoted to general or flag rank must attend an education course (CAPSTONE).

Requires all JSOs and a high proportion of other officers who graduate from a joint school to be assigned immediately to a joint duty position

Prescribes, subject to a waiver by SecDef, that joint duty tours shall be at least 3 years in length for general and flag officers and at least 3 1/2 years in length for other grades

Requires the SecDef to exclude joint training assignments and assignments within the Military Departments in the definition of 'joint duty assignments'

Specifies that each promotion board, subject to a waiver for the Marine Corps, that will consider officers who have served in JDAs shall include at least one joint duty officer designated by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)

Establishes the following review process for promotion boards considering officers:

requires the SecDef to furnish to the Secretaries of the Military Departments guidelines to ensure that promotion boards give appropriate consideration to joint duty performance;

directs the CJCS to review promotion board reports before they are submitted to the SecDef;

authorizes the Secretary of a Military Department, if the CJCS determines that the promotion board acted contrary to SecDef guidelines, to return the report to the promotion board for further proceedings, convene a special promotion board, or take other appropriate actions

directs the SecDef to take appropriate action to resolve any remaining disagreement between the Secretary of a Military Department and the CJCS

Requires the SecDef to ensure the qualifications of officers assigned to JDAs (to include JSOs not serving in JDAs) are such that certain promotion rates will be achieved (specific rates discussed later)

Requires, subject to SecDef waiver, that an officer may not be promoted to general or flag rank unless he has served in a JDA

Requires the CJCS to evaluate the joint duty performance of officers recommended for three- and four-star rank

Requires the SecDef to advise the President on the qualifications needed by officers to serve in three- and four-star positions <sup>17</sup>

Overall, the Services have struggled with Title IV's implementation. Many of the early implementors shared the sentiments of Colonel (Ret) John B. Keeley, USA, who wrote the following in an issue of Army: "Congress has created a disaster in the establishment of a joint officer management system (Title IV). In a mere eight pages, Congress has turned inside out the carefully constructed career development programs of the Services—programs that have taken years to develop are the very foundations of the military professions."<sup>18</sup>

Because of complaints by the Services, Title IV has experienced numerous modifications. First, in April 1987, DoD submitted legislative proposals for modifying Title IV. In these submissions, DoD proposed (1) changing tour lengths for joint assignments; (2) redefining promotion objectives; (3) permitting waivers of the education and experience requirements applying to joint specialists; (4) delegating authority for selecting joint specialists; and (5) designating in-Service billets as joint assignments.<sup>19</sup>

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal years 1988 and 1989 was Congress' attempt at reconciling some of the competing provisions of the original Act and to permit effective and efficient officer personnel policies without compromising the goals of the reorganization law. The new legislation addressed several of the DoD proposals but failed to approve all of them. Specifically, it modified the joint officer policies to allow waivers of certain education and experience requirements for joint specialists, permitted authority for designating joint specialists to be delegated to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DepSecDef), and allowed officers to accumulate credit toward joint tour length requirements when tours have been terminated for specified reasons.<sup>20</sup> Although not proposed by DoD, it also included changes restricting specialties that could be designated critical occupational specialties (COS) involving combat operations and the availability of short tours for officers in these specialties.<sup>21</sup>

The Air Force, firmly committed to the Act's implementation, embraced these changes and began to work towards full compliance. During a 1988 Air Force Times interview with then Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Lieutenant General Thomas Hickey stated, "the Air Force has embraced jointness as an integral part of its mission."<sup>22</sup> He further said that, "under the heading of joint duty, Air Force officers are being told that the

Air Force mission is largely an all-service mission and that they should be ready to work with their Army, Navy and Marine Corps counterparts.”<sup>23</sup>

Another change to Title IV took place in 1993. The 103rd Congress passed a bill providing joint duty credit for equivalent duty in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Additionally, it passed a bill providing additional flexibility in the assignment of officers graduating from Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) schools by allowing up to one half of the required 50 percent of officers to fulfill the post-JPME requirements during a second assignment following graduation. As we will see later, these provisions provide much needed relief to the Services.<sup>24</sup>

Although the Air Force has made significant progress towards full compliance with Title IV, there is still work to be done. Our in-depth analysis in the following chapters addresses Air Force compliance with the mandates of this legislation, focusing on its problems and successes. Further, we will examine other legislative efforts and Service policies and programs which have impacted Air Force's ability to comply with the intent of Title IV. We will limit our focus to the personnel management aspects of the legislation, restricting our research to the areas of JSO designation process, promotions, assignments and JPME for lieutenant colonels and below. After our compliance review, we will address the impact of Goldwater-Nichols legislation on OPD—an area which we found little historical research.

As you read this paper, it is important to remember the relative newness of the legislation limits the available data to support our research and affects any long-term conclusions we can make concerning Title IV's impact on the AF officer's career. Because of limited number of officers having cleared all the career wickets, we have a very

small baseline from which to make our assumptions. We hope the information which follows provides a solid foundation for further research into Title IV and its impact on the AF officer.

### **Chapter 3: Joint Specialty Officer Designation and Career Guidelines**

To ensure the Services produced officers trained and oriented toward joint matters, the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 required each Service to create an occupational category for joint officers—the JSO, and to establish career guidelines for officers of that specialty.<sup>25</sup> Eligible officers are those who complete a full program of JPME and a full joint tour—PME must be completed by the end of the joint tour unless the officer is in a career field considered as a COS. A COS officer possesses a military occupational specialty selected from among the combat arms in the Army or equivalent military specialties in the Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps.<sup>26</sup> Equivalent military specialties are those engaged in the operational art to attain strategic goals in a theater of conflict.

To conduct this research, one of our researchers visited AFMPC to review all JSO Designation Board documents for boards conducted from 1987 to 1993. Information pertaining to demographics was also obtained from the Center's Personnel Data System (PDS) historical tapes and from a variety of historical files maintained at the Center.<sup>27</sup> In reviewing AFMPC documents, researchers found the AF has selected over 5,400 officers for the JSO designation via a JSO Designation Board process—approximately 2,860 were lieutenant colonels and below, the subject of this paper. The AF conducted designation boards in two phases—the first, a transition period during 1987-1989, in which officers did not have to meet all designation requisites; and those post-transition boards, conducted in 1991, 1993, and most recently in 1995, where officers were required to meet



all JSO designation requisites, unless waived on a case-by-case basis by DepSecDef. As such, this chapter will first examine the two phases of the JSO designation process—transition and fully qualified. Additionally, it will provide an analysis of the AF JSO revalidation effort, in which they revoked the JSO designation status of over 300 officers. Last, this chapter will examine AF initiatives to establish and monitor career guidelines for the JSO.

First, from 1987-1989, the AF conducted three transition boards for lieutenant colonels and below, during which over 2,780 JSOs were designated.<sup>28</sup> Although the law required JSOs to complete a complete program of JPME followed by a full JDA, during the transition provisions of the Act, only one of the two requisites was required for designation and the JPME/JDA sequence requirement did not apply.<sup>29</sup> Further, the transition guidelines allowed for joint equivalent tour counters—that is officers who were currently in, or had been previously assigned to “in-Service positions in which significant interdepartmental interface and liaison, involving above staff functions, conducted on a routine basis,” received credit for a JDA.<sup>30</sup> Each board member was charged by a letter of instruction to “select a pool of officers to be nominated to the DepSecDef for approval of the award of the Joint Specialty . . . and to ensure that the officers selected for nomination have the highest standards of performance, experience, and education.” For all boards, the instructions, which were approved by the Chairman or Vice Chairman, JCS, further stated, “it is expected that the officers nominated shall have the same overall quality as those officers selected for assignment to the Service headquarters staffs.”<sup>31 32 33</sup>

According to AFMPC archives (JSO Designation Board Briefings; AFMPC/DPMR Operating Instructions, 36-15, Joint Specialty Officer Board Procedures,<sup>34</sup> and working

papers), the AFMPC staff conducted a pre-board quality review to eliminate officers who met the following conditions from board consideration:

- Existing Unfavorable Information File
- Weight Management Program participant
- A '2' in the last five Officer Effectiveness Reports (OER)
- An Article 15
- Control Roster action
- Drug/Alcohol Abuse Control Program entry
- Promotion propriety action<sup>35</sup>

Mirroring the AF promotion selection process, board scoring was based on a 6.0 to 10.0 half point scoring range and was conducted by secret ballot, with the board reviewing the officer selection folder, which contained OERs, Training Reports, an official photograph, decoration citations, along with an officer selection brief, which is a computerized product containing the assignment history, grade information, time-in-service, etc. Differing from the promotion process, each officer was considered by AF Specialty Code or Major Weapon System (MWS), with a JSO Designation Board Worksheet submitted from the officer's assignment team to the board. This worksheet highlighted JSO qualification data and provided an overall assignment team joint utility assessment to be considered when evaluating the officer for award of the joint specialty designator. An order of merit was established by the board—the JSO selection rate was based on AF Specialty Code or MWS, considering joint duty or joint critical assignment requirements. Each designation board had a General Officer board president and at least one board member, currently serving in a JDA, appointed by the CJCS, to serve as his representative on the board. The three transition boards were conducted in three phases—the 19-23 October 1987 board which considered 1,972 officers currently in JDAs. Second, there was the 7 -18 March 1988 board which considered 3,944 officers

with at least two years of joint duty and/or JPME, along with officers identified by assignment teams as having Joint Equivalent assignments. Last, there was a 28 March-7 April 1989 board, which considered 4,375 officers who met the above criteria and were not selected for designation by previous boards, in addition to newly identified officers, who were identified as a result of a re-scrub of the eligible officer data-base. What was unique regarding the last transition board was that assignment teams were more involved in identifying their projected joint requirements.<sup>36</sup> Although the board proceedings were well documented<sup>37 38 39</sup> and complied with the mandates of the law and guidance published in the 21 May 1987, 22 July 1987 and 4 February 1988 DepSecDef Memorandums,<sup>40 41 42</sup> there were some long-term problems associated with this mass-designation process.

First, the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) is a fluid document, with frequent changes to Service mix, AF Specialty Codes, and grade alignment.<sup>43</sup> The transition JSO designations were based on the first JDAL publication, dated 1 September 1987.<sup>44</sup> As a consequence, officers were designated as JSOs, although their future joint utility was based on current joint requirements—designated on speculation, many times based on an assignment officer's or analyst's best estimate for future joint requirements. Further, officers were designated early in their careers before their promotion potential could be fully assessed. This proved to be very costly when the AF failed to meet the promotion expectations years after the transition designation process—once a JSO, an officer's promotion status is always monitored and measured against the Service headquarters promotion rate. This will be further discussed in the following chapter on promotions. It appears the main driver behind the mass transition designation was the size and composition of the early JDAL and the legislative requirement to fill 50 percent of the

positions with JSOs or JSO nominees. The AF produced enough of a JSO pool to sustain this 50 percent fill requirement, until they could begin producing fully qualified JSOs, which was projected for 1992. Concern for meeting the 50 percent fill rates led to the transition-era designation of over 5,300 colonels and below—over 80 percent of whom had JPME or JDA waived for designation.<sup>45</sup> Unfortunately, as mentioned above, the long-term promotability and utility of this pool was deficient, despite the detailed pre-designation analysis and quality scrub. Another interesting factor was officers deferred to lieutenant colonel were designated as JSOs during the transition period, which appears to be in conflict with the overarching legal mandate for JSOs to be at least the same or higher overall quality as the Service headquarters staff.<sup>46</sup> Although there were some long-term problems generated by the transition designation era, the designation process appeared to be in compliance with the mandates and intent of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation—to identify a pool of officers educated and experienced in the employment, deployment and support of unified and combined forces to achieve national security objectives.

The first post-transition JSO Designation Board using fully qualified requisites was conducted in December 1991. Like the transition boards, the board instruction, which emphasized the board's responsibility to nominate officers with the highest standards of performance, experience, and education were approved by CJCS. The Chairman also appointed an officer currently serving in a JDA as his representative. Similar to transition boards, the AFMPC staff conducted a quality review of those eligible officers competing for designation since the board was instructed to select officers with "the highest standards of performance, experience and education," and "the same overall quality as officers selected for assignment to the Service headquarters staff."<sup>47</sup> The board reviewed the

records of 35 fully qualified officers to be nominated to the DepSecDef for award of the Joint Specialty designator—of those 24 were recommended for designation. In contrast with the large transition boards of 1987-1989, officers were not considered by AF Specialty Code or MWS eligibility categories. There were 16 additional officers considered for designation waivers, which are limited by law to 10 percent of the number of JSOs designated annually, by grade. Accordingly, one mission support officer was recommended for designation by (sequence) waiver, based on completing his JDA in advance of JPME.<sup>48</sup>


What is noteworthy about this board is: 1) the small eligibility population; 2) the selection for designation without regard for AF Specialty Code or MWS; and 3) the high selection rate—69 percent of those fully-qualified were nominated for selection. What influenced the small eligibility population was that only two years transpired since the previous (transition) JSO Designation Board, which was a small time-frame for officers to have completed their JPME and JDA. Additionally, the staff culled those officers with quality indicators, deferred promotion status or approved retirement or separation dates—this significantly reduced the eligibility pool. As for the selection without regard for AF Specialty Code or MWS, the eligibility pool was so small and there was a high opportunity to be assigned to joint special duty assignments if selected for JSO designation, so there was joint utility regardless of career field. Last, the higher selection rate appears to be related to the high quality of the eligible pool, which encompassed in-resident PME graduates and officers selected for below-the-zone promotion (BPZ). Since the Service headquarters quality is the law's measuring stick for JSOs, it appears that the board met the expectation by selecting top quality officers for designation.

The next JSO Designation Board was conducted in October 1993. Of the 404 officers considered, the board nominated 60 to DepSecDef for designation, resulting in a 15 percent selection rate. The board was administered much like the 1991 board; however, there appears to have been more focus on selecting officers in AF Specialty Codes or MWSs with a high probability for future joint utility, e.g., Intelligence and Communications/Computers officers, were selected at much higher rates than the board average, 24 and 34 percent, respectively.<sup>49</sup> The board instructions and procedures mirrored the 1991 process.

The AF conducted its most recent JSO Designation Board in March 1995. Although results have not been approved by SecDef as of the date of this paper, the preliminary selection results show that of 660 considered, 192 or 29 percent were selected for designation. Of those designated, 68 percent were BPZ to one or more grades. The researchers did not accomplish a compliance review of this board, because it was recently conducted and the results have not been completely staffed, or approved by SecDef.

What is significantly different between recently conducted boards and the transition boards of 1987-1989 is the remarkable improvement in the JSO quality. For example, 39 percent of the all 1987 board designees were BPZ to one or more grades. This dropped to 19 percent for those designated by the 1988 and 1989 boards; however, grew to 77 and 68 percent for the 1993 and 1995 boards, respectively. The nine percent decrease in BPZ officers selected for the 1995 board does not necessarily denote a reduced quality, in light of the fact over three times as many officers were designated. Figure 1 shows the BPZ trends for JSOs based on the year designations were approved and updated in the personnel data system. As such, the 1987 board is reflected as 1988,

and the 1988 and 1989 boards are shown as 1989. Both the 1991 and 1993 boards were not approved or updated until the following year; therefore, they will be reflected on Figure 1 as 1992 and 1994, respectively.<sup>50</sup>




Source: AFMPC/DPMYAF

**Figure 1: JSO Designation Percent BPZ Selects**

This same quality improvement can also be seen by examining the number JSOs who were resident PME graduates when selected for designation. For instance, in 1989, only 33 percent of newly designated lieutenant colonel JSOs had resident Intermediate Service School (ISS) and only 7 percent had resident Senior Service School (SSS), as compared to 1994 when 100 percent of lieutenant colonels were ISS resident graduates and another 51 percent had resident SSS. The 1995 preliminary results also show a similar trend, for 100 percent of the majors and 99 percent of the lieutenant colonels had resident ISS.<sup>51</sup> Based on the high quality of JSOs in the post-transition era, it is apparent AF has been aggressive to ensure future promotion expectations will be met. Unfortunately, it is difficult to establish precisely when this compliance will occur, for as long as yesterday's transition JSOs are still in the inventory, they will continue to affect AF compliance with Goldwater-Nichols.

The deficient, long-term promotability of the transition pool can best be shown by examining the deferred promotion rates. In 1988, only 1 percent of JSOs were deferred; however, as the pool aged, its deferred rate increased to a high of 26 percent in 1993. It was this long-term quality issue which served as the catalyst for AF to conduct an in-depth analysis of the composition of the JSO pool, which eventually led to the first JSO revocation action taken by any Service in 1993. Figure 2 shows the deferred for promotion rates of the JSO pool.<sup>52</sup>



Source: AFMPC/DPMYAF

**Figure 2: JSO Pool Percent Deferred**

As mentioned, AF conducted a SecDef approved JSO revalidation process beginning in the Summer of 1992 and completing in April 1993. The intent of the revalidation effort was to identify surplus JSOs for revocation of the JSO designator by the SecDef. As background, what initially prompted such action was AF's failure to meet the JSO promotion objectives for several promotion boards—JSOs were not being promoted at the Service headquarters rate. Consequently, AFMPC examined the JSO pool and determined that of the transition JSOs, 42 percent had never served in a JDA.<sup>53</sup> They also found there were 11 JSOs for every critical joint billet and there were JSOs in career fields with no



joint critical requirements, e.g., Air Traffic Control, Weather, Missile Maintenance, Finance, Security Police, and Special Investigations.<sup>54</sup> An AFMPC briefing to the Air Force Director of Personnel (AF/DP) in February 1992 highlighted the concern that the AF must count JSOs who “haven’t and won’t serve in JDAs. . . .” also, “these JSOs skew our pool’s actual joint utility; less assets than what’s reflected” and “we over-designated during the transition period and now must cull our pool.”<sup>55</sup> At that time, there had never been revocation action taken by any Service and no formal revocation procedures existed. This action was not specifically addressed in Title 10, and there was only a draft DoD Directive on Joint Officer Management, stating that SecDef may revoke JSO status on a case-by-case basis. The draft Directive was clear in stating that non-promotion could not be the sole basis of revocation action.<sup>56</sup> However, the AF was not considering revocation based on non-promotion. Instead, justification was there were surplus JSOs in career fields with no future joint utility. Promotion results were merely the catalyst to conduct a complete review of the JSO assets.

Following an in-depth analysis of the JSO pool, AF staffed a request for a JSO ‘revalidation’ through CJCS to the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Force Management and Personnel (ASD (FM&P)) for approval. On 29 June 1992, AF was granted ASD (FM&P) approval to proceed with a one-time revalidation of the JSO designator of 450 officers . . . .” “based on the draw-down, the AF’s reorganization, and the uncertainties surrounding the initial JSO designations.”<sup>57</sup> An interesting side note is the Army followed suit with the revalidation effort, and in April 1993 they also received approval to conduct a one-time revalidation of their JSO pool.<sup>58</sup> Apparently, overproduction of the transition pool was not AF unique.

The revalidation process was very objective. First, the AF identified all transitional JSOs who had not served in JDAs. The second objective criteria was to eliminate from revalidation consideration those JSOs who had not served in a JDA, but were either resident PME graduates or BPZ promotees—both positive quality indicators.<sup>59</sup> On 11 August 1992, 311 officers were notified by an AFMPC/CC letter that their JSO designation status was being reviewed for revocation consideration. The letter indicated that revocation action was based on an excess of JSOs designated under the DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 transition rules and the existence of a more stringent process to designate new JSOs. These officers were given opportunity to refute the administrative revocation action in writing by 8 September 1992. Affected officers were provided a comprehensive overview of the revalidation effort, along with background information on Goldwater-Nichols legislation and the JSO transition designation period. The Fact Sheet stated, "Because the Air Force is producing fully qualified JSOs under the new standards, and due to extensive force restructuring within Department of Defense, there is no need to retain JSO officers selected under the transition boards who will not be required to serve in a critical joint position." The Fact Sheet further stated, "JSO revocation is strictly a classification action and removes the member from the pool of officers considered for assignment to a critical joint requirement."<sup>60</sup>

The revalidation process served its purpose to eliminate surplus JSOs in career fields with limited joint critical utility. The process was objective—if a JSO had not served in a JDA since designation (a 4-5 year period) and did not have a high probability to serve in a joint critical requirement, they had their JSO administrative designator revoked. Individuals were notified in advance that they were being considered for revocation action

and they were educated on the process. Further, they were given an opportunity to provide information why this action should not take place. The revalidation effort was approved in advance by ASD (FM&P) and final revocation action on 311 officers was approved by SecDef after being staffed through the Director, Joint Staff.<sup>61</sup> The affected officers were advised of the revocation approval on 21 May 1993, and the PDS was updated in June 1993 to reflect a code 'W' for those officers.<sup>62</sup> Based on the limited number of JSOs being generated by fully qualified boards, it may take several years to regenerate a replacement pool of fully qualified JSOs with high joint utilization; however, it is probably prudent to say if a transition JSO was not utilized in a JDA in the 4-5 year period following their designation, their future joint utility was limited.

As stated earlier in this chapter, the SecDef, with CJCS advice, is responsible to establish career guidelines for officers designated as JSOs. These guidelines are more extensive than the JSO selection process for they also encompass "military education; training; types of duty assignments; and such matters as the Secretary considers appropriate."<sup>63</sup> When legislation was imposed, AF already had "highly visible, viable career development guidelines for each utilization field." These guidelines were published in Air Force Regulation (AFR) 36-23, Officer Career Development, which provided AF officers a comprehensive overview on career development program 'elements' such as PME, training, educational assignments, with optimal phase points. At the time of the law's implementation, this regulation already incorporated (brief) references to joint duty, via career progression guide charts, presented by utilization field. The AF, realizing the need for additional emphasis on joint, chose to use this regulation as the media vehicle; however, with modifications to strengthen the emphasis on joint duty and education as a

part of an officer's overall career development.<sup>64</sup> Essentially, they attempted to meet the requirement with the modification of a pre-existing publication.

A review of AF/DP Program Action Directive (PAD) 87-1, Implementation of The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, Title IV, Joint Officer Personnel Management, 23 January 1987, also stated AF's intent to use AFR 36-23, to implement JSO career guidelines. The PAD did mention a feasibility study of developing a separate JSO Career Management Directive; however, this was never pursued. In the end, the AF modified AFR 36-23 to reflect the importance of joint assignments and education.<sup>65</sup> Our research team reviewed the regulation and determined that although joint education and assignments were mentioned, specific guidelines for the joint specialty were never defined. This same joint emphasis was reflected in the publication of Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 36-13, Officer Professional Development, published 1 March 1989, where approximately a page was dedicated to 'joint departmental' assignments in Chapter 9.<sup>66</sup>

The AF will supersede AFR 36-23 and AFP 36-13 with the publication of the AFP 36-2630, Officer Professional Development Guide, which is in final coordination.<sup>67</sup> In its coordination form, this pamphlet does not address Goldwater-Nichols legislation, although joint duty is mentioned throughout as a requisite for General Officer promotion, and as being critical to war-fighting.<sup>68</sup> Although the joint specialty is mentioned several times, it is never defined.

The intent of this pamphlet is to provide officers by career field an overview of each career path; providing the reader information on different tracks; i.e., broad, staff, operations, leadership, technical expertise, etc. Each career field has a career path matrix,

which “shows the types of jobs and experience that are mandatory, essential, desired, or optional for success. . . .”<sup>69</sup> Without exception, joint duty is mentioned in every career field with joint requirements, with some variations noted between rated and support fields. In the rated officer path, joint is viewed as staff position option in the leadership track. The pamphlet states, “In this track, a person will have a solid flying background and a mixture of high-level staff jobs (MAJCOM [Major Command], Air Staff **or joint**).”<sup>70</sup> The support career paths dictate a stronger line on the importance of joint by stating, “A joint-duty tour is a mandatory requirement for promotion to general officer (GO). Officers should consider joint duty early in their field grade career so they do not limit their options when promoted to colonel.”<sup>71</sup> As stated earlier, nowhere in the career paths is the JSO provided any specific guidelines concerning career development. The focus of the pamphlet is that joint duty is key to war-fighting; a balanced career includes staff duty (of which joint is an option); ISS students should expect either a JDA, MAJCOM, or Air Staff assignment; and if an officer aspires to be a GO, joint duty should be acquired early as a field grade officer. How joint duty is integrated into AF’s OPD program will be further discussed in Chapter 8.

Has AF met the intent of the law to “establish career guidelines for joint specialty officers”?<sup>72</sup> If the intent of the law was to provide concrete career guidance to JSOs, then as shown above, they have failed. If the law’s intent was to provide a system to track and monitor JSOs, then they have succeeded. The AF clearly identifies JSOs in their personnel data-base, on Officer Selection Briefs (OSBs) for promotion boards, and when a JSO is pending assignment upon graduation from a National Defense University (NDU) school. The AF also closely tracks JSO nominees via their PDS—they have a firm grasp of which

officers have met the education and assignment requisites to become a JSO. This same JSO career guidelines issue surfaced in an AF/DPXOX staff summary sheet, 29 January 1992, when AF/DP recommended a game plan to ensure AF meets the promotion requirements of Title IV. The recommended course of action was to develop a formal program to ensure JSOs are counseled by assignment officers "on professional development opportunities (assignment and education)" . . . to ensure they "remain competitive for promotion."<sup>73</sup> Although this plan was approved by Vice CSAF, the research team could find no indication a system was ever formalized to provide JSOs career guidelines. As such, the research team concluded that AF failed in its responsibility to provide career guidelines for JSOs, although they did provide a structure to monitor their career progression via promotions and PME outplacement.

## **Chapter 4: Promotions**

Title IV contains numerous joint requirements pertaining to the promotion of AF officers. For sometime, the quality of officers in joint assignments has been of great concern to Congress, DoD, and the CJCS. In order to maintain a certain level of quality in joint assignments, Congress dictated in law procedures and thresholds that apply to the promotion process. This chapter reviews the provisions of the law applying to AF officer promotions; provides a comparison showing whether the AF met these provisions; briefly addresses other factors affecting joint officer promotions; and provides recommendations on how to improve compliance.

First, the provisions of the law require the quality of officers in joint duty be such they are expected to be promoted at certain levels; that the CJCS participate in the promotion process; that certain promotion procedures be followed; and that promotion rates are reported to Congress. Since DoD reports the joint promotion rates to Congress, this chapter concentrates on the first three requirements. Appendix C1 provides a more detailed summary of the provisions in the law by section.

The scope of this paper is limited by the law and policy. Based on DoD policy the joint promotion requirements in the law apply only to Line of the Air Force competitive category officers and those billets with authorized grades above captain.<sup>74</sup> This policy excludes the other seven competitive categories in the AF: Judge Advocate General Department Officers, Chaplain Corps, Biomedical Sciences Corps, Medical Service Corps, Nurse Corps, Medical Corps, and Dental Corps. Since 10 United States Code (USC) 661

provides that only officers in the grade of captain or above may be selected for the joint specialty, only those boards to major and above are tracked for joint promotion expectations. This paper only addresses promotion boards to the grades of colonel, lieutenant colonel, and major; promotion rates to the grades of brigadier and major general are not discussed. Also, this research focuses on officers on the active-duty list as provided in 10 USC 620, Active-duty Lists, and those promotion boards convened in accordance with (IAW) 10 USC 611, Convening of Selection Boards.

The particular requirements of these three areas warrant closer attention prior to reviewing how the AF has complied with the provisions of the law. The promotion levels joint officers are measured against depend on the kind of joint position or organization the officer is assigned to, or whether an officer has received the JSO designator. The JSO designation process is outlined in Chapter 3. Three joint promotion categories were established by this legislation: Joint Staff, JSOs, and Other Joint. Officers are placed in the Joint Staff category if they are assigned to the Joint Staff, or have been assigned to the Joint Staff. Officers are placed in the JSO category if they have been designated by the SecDef as a JSO. The JSOs who are assigned to the Joint Staff are counted in both the Joint Staff and JSO categories. Officers are placed in the Other Joint category if they are assigned to or have been assigned to a billet in joint assignments listed on the JDAL. Officers coded as JSOs and/or Joint Staff are not included in the Other Joint category. The promotion rates for officers on the Joint Staff are compared to the promotion rates for officers on the Air Staff; promotion rates for JSOs are compared to the promotion rates for officers on the Air Staff, and promotion rates for officers in other joint assignments are compared to the promotion rates for the Service average (Line of the AF



board average). The promotion rates used are the actual selection rates figured for each category as a result of a promotion board. The selection rate is a percentage computed by dividing the number of officers selected by the number of eligible officers. These assessments are conducted for officers competing for promotion In-The-Promotion Zone (IPZ), Below-The-Promotion Zone (BPZ), and Above-The-Promotion Zone (APZ) in each category. Officers selected for promotion IPZ are those selected on time with their peer group; those selected BPZ are promoted ahead of their peer group; and those selected APZ are promoted after their peer group. Within these categories, the promotion rates are also compared for those officers currently serving-in and those who have-served in these areas, except for JSOs and the Service average. JSOs are designated by qualification, not by the position they are assigned to; therefore, they are not divided into the serving-in and have-served categories. Tracking of officers in the have-served category is only accomplished for the first promotion board following reassignment out of a joint organization or the Air Staff.

Several procedures are in place to involve the CJCS in the promotion process. First, he approves the joint representatives to promotion boards. Second, the CJCS reviews results of promotion boards which consider joint officers. In this review, he determines if the promotion board followed SecDef guidance regarding joint officers and gave appropriate promotion consideration to joint officers. The CJCS reviews the board results and provides determinations and comments to the Secretary of the Air Force (SecAF). Based on his determinations and comments, SecAF transmits the report to SecDef or takes other actions as appropriate to alleviate CJCS concerns.

Other requirements of the law mandate each board considering the promotion of joint officers will have a joint officer on the board. Also, the promotion board will be instructed to ensure appropriate consideration is given to the performance in joint duty assignments of officers who are serving-in or have-served in such assignments. The law requires SecAF provide the CJCS the board report for review when joint officers have been considered by the board. Further, the law that requires processing of promotion boards through the CJCS also applies to Special Selection Boards (SSB) reports.

Since the passing of Goldwater-Nichols legislation on 1 October 1986, the AF implemented actions mandated by the law and has continually updated and adjusted their efforts to comply with all aspects of the legislation. While a number of efforts have been taken in the areas of joint specialty designations, joint assignments, and JPME, this chapter focuses on compliance with joint promotion expectations. The AF implemented several procedures to provide clearly stated SecAF instructions to promotion boards regarding the importance of joint and identification of joint officers to promotion board membership. Table 5 at Appendix C2 provides a chronology of these actions and others, which have impacted AF implementation of joint officer management relating to officer promotions. One should note the effects from some actions have slowly evolved and are associated with other aspects of the joint officer management system.

The SecAF instructions to promotion board members were strengthened several times since the implementation of Goldwater-Nichols legislation in 1986. The first version provided that promotion boards "... should give appropriate consideration to the performance of officers who are serving-in or have served in joint duty assignments."<sup>75</sup> Over the years, those words have evolved into the following: "For the Line competitive

category, joint duty experience is an extremely important consideration for promotion.

The law requires that the qualifications of officers assigned to joint duty be such that they are expected, as a group, to be promoted at a rate not less than the rate for all AF officers in the same grade and competitive category. There are three objectives: . . . [promotion objectives are outlined above]. It is important that these statutory objectives be met.”<sup>76</sup>

Another initiative involves joint officers being clearly identified on the computer summary (OSB) in the Officer Selection Record—their joint status is indicated on the summary using the following terms: ‘Joint Staff,’ ‘JSO,’ and/or ‘Other JDA.’<sup>77</sup> In addition to placing these three joint officer reporting categories on the summary, the AF, in October 1993, started using an officer’s joint duty history on the summary listing the organization and dates of assignment.<sup>78 79</sup> The AF has also complied with the law to have a joint officer on promotion boards considering joint officers for promotion. The processing of SSB reports through the CJCS is also mandated by the law and is being complied with by the AF.

So far the items considered have been the legislative requirements and AF efforts to meet these requirements. Now, let us consider the results of how the promotion comparisons have fared in the reportable categories. More detailed information with the actual selection percents for each board, grade, zone and category are found in Tables 6-37 contained in Appendices C3-C5.

Three comparison schemes are provided:

- As a group average promotion rates (Appendix C3)
- As a group by board promotion rates (Appendix C4)
- Serving-in and have-served by board promotion rates (Appendix C5)

This review revealed the detailed areas that perhaps warrant continued monitoring and emphasis:

- Officers meeting colonel boards IPZ and BPZ serving-in the Joint Staff
- Officers meeting colonel boards IPZ, BPZ and APZ that have-served on the Joint Staff
- Officers meeting lieutenant colonel boards IPZ serving-in the Joint Staff
- Officers meeting lieutenant colonel boards BPZ that have-served on the Joint Staff
- Officers meeting major boards BPZ that have-served on the Joint Staff
- JSOs meeting colonel boards IPZ and BPZ compared to officers that have-served on the Service headquarters
- JSOs meeting lieutenant colonel boards IPZ and BPZ
- JSOs meeting lieutenant colonel boards APZ compared to officers serving-in the Service headquarters
- Officers meeting colonel boards BPZ serving-in Other Joint assignments
- Officers meeting colonel boards IPZ, BPZ, and APZ that have-served in Other Joint assignments
- Officers meeting lieutenant colonel boards APZ that have-served in Other Joint assignments
- Officers meeting major boards APZ that have-served in Other Joint duty assignments

Table 1 summarizes how well the AF has met promotion expectations based on comparison Scheme 3 and specifically provides the number of boards the particular categories have met or exceeded the promotion requirements of the law. Those possible problematic areas are bolded; these areas have met the promotion expectations on fewer than 50 percent of the promotion boards. For example, colonels serving-in the Joint Staff

meeting the board IPZ met or exceeded the requirements of the law on only two of six boards. A number of these categories have met the law's requirements for each board held or for all boards except for one; these categories are underlined. In addition, to identify those boards that were close to meeting the promotion expectations, one more select was added to boards not meeting the expectations. These categories with one select added that would have met or exceeded the law's requirements for all boards held are annotated with an asterisk. The remaining areas that met promotion expectations less than 50 percent of the time are bolded.

Table 1 below shows 5 of 46 categories have met the promotion expectations for all boards in that grade, zone, and assignment (or designation in the case of JSOs). Another eight categories have met the promotion expectations for all but one board in that grade, zone, or assignment (or designation in the case of JSOs). Both of these categories are underlined. Another 10 categories would have met the promotion expectations on all boards with one more select added in that grade, zone, and assignment (or designation in the case of JSOs). These categories are identified with an asterisk. So far this shows 23 of 46 categories either met or came close to meeting the promotion expectations. In addition to these 23, 16 other categories were significantly below compliance for promotion expectations and warrant future monitoring. However, four of these categories show promise. Officers meeting colonel boards BPZ serving-in the Joint Staff have only met promotion expectations on two of six boards; however, those two have been in the last three boards. Officers meeting lieutenant colonel boards IPZ serving-in Joint Staff have only met promotion expectations on two of seven boards; however, those two boards were the last two boards held. JSOs meeting lieutenant colonel boards IPZ have

met expectations on the last board held calendar year 1994 (CY94), both in the serving-in and have-served categories. The other 7 categories fall in the median and warrant consideration; but, perhaps not as much as the 16 categories which have shown less than sterling results.

**Table 1: Attainment of Promotion Rates by Grade and Category<sup>80</sup>**

|          | IPZ            | IPZ           | BPZ            | BPZ            | APZ            | APZ           |
|----------|----------------|---------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|---------------|
|          | Serving-in     | Have-served   | Serving-in     | Have-served    | Serving-in     | Have-served   |
| Colonel  |                |               |                |                |                |               |
| JT Staff | <b>2 OF 6*</b> | <b>2 OF 6</b> | <b>2 OF 6</b>  | <b>0 OF 6</b>  | <u>5 OF 6*</u> | 2 OF 5*       |
| JSO      | <u>5 OF 6</u>  | <b>1 OF 6</b> | 4 OF 6         | <b>1 OF 6</b>  | 4 OF 6         | 3 OF 6        |
| Other JT | <u>5 OF 6</u>  | <b>1 OF 6</b> | <b>1 OF 6</b>  | <b>2 OF 6</b>  | <u>5 OF 6*</u> | <b>1 OF 6</b> |
|          |                |               |                |                |                |               |
| Lt Col   |                |               |                |                |                |               |
| JT Staff | <b>2 OF 7</b>  | 3 OF 6        | <u>7 OF 7</u>  | 1 OF 6*        | 3 OF 6*        | 3 OF 6*       |
| JSO      | <b>2 OF 7</b>  | <b>1 OF 7</b> | <b>0 OF 5</b>  | <b>0 OF 5</b>  | <b>2 OF 7</b>  | 5 OF 7        |
| Other JT | <u>7 OF 7</u>  | 5 OF 7        | <u>6 OF 7*</u> | <u>6 OF 7*</u> | <u>7 OF 7</u>  | <b>3 OF 7</b> |
|          |                |               |                |                |                |               |
| Major    |                |               |                |                |                |               |
| JT Staff | <u>3 OF 4*</u> | <u>3 OF 3</u> | 2 OF 4*        | 1 OF 3*        | N/A            | N/A           |
| Other JT | <u>6 OF 6</u>  | 4 OF 6        | <u>5 OF 6*</u> | 3 OF 6*        | 4 OF 6*        | 1 OF 5*       |

Source: AFMPC/DPMYAP

Note: The underlined categories met expectations for all boards or all boards except one. The asterisks denote those categories that would have met expectations for all boards with one more select added. The bolded categories are possible problem areas which have met the expectations on 50 percent or fewer of the promotion boards.

Several enhancements of the AF joint officer management system have been made since 1987. The AF may not have reached the point where the full benefits have been realized from all enhancements. Some of these initiatives take years to evolve and may or may not impact promotion rates. Therefore, promotion rates should be reviewed in the above manner after each calendar year.

The promotion system as it relates to joint officers is not a 'closed' system. Other factors have a considerable impact on the management of the promotion system and joint officers. This section highlights other aspects of the law impacting AF's ability to comply with the mandates of Goldwater-Nichols legislation.

Title 10, Sections 616 (a) and 617 (a) require promotion boards to select the "... best qualified ..." officers for promotion. All of the AF promotion boards conducted since the monitoring of joint officer promotion rates have met the criteria of selecting the best qualified officers for promotion, even though not all of the joint promotion expectations were met. For those boards where the joint promotion rates did not meet the requirements of 10 USC 667, the CJCS was satisfied that the boards gave appropriate consideration to joint officers and followed SecDef guidance regarding joint promotions. Additionally, DoD approved all the boards and the Senate confirmed promotion of all the officers as the best qualified officers for promotion. The question becomes which law should take precedence: 10 USC 616 (a) and 617 (a), the selection of the best qualified officers, or 10 USC 667, expectations of joint promotion rates. In the view of the researchers, the promotion of the best qualified officers for promotion must take precedence, since the joint promotion comparisons are expectations established by Congress to ensure quality officers are assigned to joint duties—the intent of Congress does not appear to be to direct the promotion of joint officers over more qualified and talented officers. Unfortunately, in times of 'missed' promotion rates, the focus has been misplaced on the promotion selection aspects of joint officer management, e.g., strengthened board charges, identification of joint officers to the promotion board, etc. The question is why is the quality of officers assigned to joint duty lower than the

expectations? To answer, we must look to the training, education, assignment, and OPD of joint officers. When the AF equally assigns its best to both joint assignments and Service requirements, the joint promotion rates should improve, and the conflict between the best qualified and joint expectations will be resolved.

In addition to joint, promotion boards give consideration to multiple special interest groups, e.g., Acquisition, women and minorities, thereby making the board process more involved and perhaps more difficult to meet the joint provisions of the law. Since both Acquisition and joint promotion tracking is relatively new, the interface between the two systems is still being examined. However, as both of these systems and Service billets compete for the best qualified officers; the management of professional development through assignments becomes increasingly difficult. These assignments have a direct impact on meeting or not meeting promotion expectations. In other words, the assignment of non-joint officers affects joint promotion rates as much as the assignment of joint officers. Also, there is a direct correlation between the organization and position an officer is assigned against and the promotion category in which an officer is tracked. Last, the JSO designation process has a direct relationship on the quality of JSOs, which also impacts the promotion rates.

This gets more complex as we consider career fields with a high proportion of joint billets, but with a lower percentage of general officer and colonel positions. In effect, the AF may 'push' to fill these joint billets with quality officers, who in the long term have very limited assignment opportunities. This is contrary to the ideal of promoting the best qualified officers for future leadership positions, no matter what the career field. It seems to be illogical to require large numbers of officers in a particular career area to serve joint,



and then promote them; but not provide them an adequate number of leadership positions. This inconsistency between promotions and joint assignments needs to be evaluated and changes made.

Several other dichotomies between the promotion of officers and the assignment process are worth mentioning. The promotion of the best qualified officers is accomplished by competitive category regardless of career area; however, the assignment selection process is accomplished by career area. The assignment system assigns officers to joint positions by career area based on duty performance; however, the promotion system uses more than just duty performance in the selection of officers for promotion. AFI 36-2110 provides that the primary selection criterion for assignment is "... the person's qualification to fill a valid military requirement . . ." <sup>81</sup> "Secondary factors such as volunteer status, time on station (TOS), deferment from assignment selection, or other criteria . . ." and "... individual preferences, join-spouse, humanitarian, or special circumstances to the degree possible." <sup>82</sup> On the other hand, selection for promotion is based on the whole person concept, using evidence of potential to serve in a higher grade. Such evidence may be found by considering job performance, professional qualities, leadership, depth and breadth of experience, job responsibility, academic and professional military education, specific achievements, and any other facet of the officer's record." <sup>83</sup> The mismatch between the two systems needs to be studied in greater depth.

Considering the mismatches in the promotion and assignment systems, how should the AF select the right officers early enough in their careers, send them to joint duty, and still continue to provide the Service breadth and depth enroute to leadership positions? The researchers believe the answer is through OPD. The AF is prohibited in pre-selecting

officers prior to promotion boards without having the safeguards provided in law and policy during any such pre-selection boards. So how is the Service supposed to know who will get promoted next year, or in 2 years, or in 10 years? The officer promotion system is supposed to be tamper proof in order to provide for a fair and equitable opportunity for all officers, without using any directed promotions to meet rates for joint, Acquisition, women, or minorities. Because officers progress at different rates, a 'late bloomer' kept in AF channels could later advance over a joint officer who may have quickly progressed early in their career, but faded. The AF needs to re-engineer their OPD program in order to provide in depth coherent linked management of joint and non-joint to give the United States the "... youthful, vigorous, fully combat-ready officer force" that Congress has been concerned with since as early as 1861.<sup>84</sup>

Other activities underway may affect joint promotions. The DoD JDAL study is considering proposals to: reduce the JDAL; add captain (03) positions to the JDAL; change organizational joint content; and, add certain Service positions. All of these proposals, if implemented, will impact joint promotion management to some degree. This impact needs to be continuously evaluated to ensure professional development initiatives are appropriately adjusted to ensure congruence with these modifications. In addition, a current RAND Corporation study of officer careers is looking at extending officer careers and expanding promotion windows. If accepted by DoD, the results of this study need to be scrutinized from a joint perspective.

So what should the AF do? In our view, the AF needs to continue to closely monitor and analyze joint promotion rates in all categories. For example, the AF monitors officer promotion timing and opportunity through a Management Information System

(MIS). However, no MIS has been created to track joint promotion rates. Granted, promotion rates are reported by the AF to the Joint Staff, and to the DoD, and thereafter reported to Congress. This is accomplished on a board-by-board basis and in an annual DoD report. However, AF should consider tracking promotion rates by category in addition to the by-board analysis. As the result of this type of analysis, this research detected that 13 of 46 categories have met promotion expectations on none or one board. Additionally, of five boards considering JSOs for BPZ promotion to lieutenant colonel, the promotion expectations were not met for any of the boards either in the serving-in and have-served categories. The AF should also ensure tracking systems are implemented to evaluate any initiatives to improve joint promotion rates. For example, the JSO status of 311 officers was revoked in 1993. Although this revocation was based on future utilization, this action was prompted by failure to meet promotion expectations. Have all of these officers filtered through the system and has there been a positive impact on promotion rates? An analysis of this revocation pool shows that 153 of the 311 are still on active duty. Of these, 109 are lieutenant colonels—23 or 21 percent of which are one or more times deferred for promotion to colonel. This deferred rate is two percent lower than the Air Force average in 1994; nonetheless, JSOs are compared against Air Staff promotion rates.<sup>85</sup> Further, a review of the promotion board results shows that the revalidation initiative does not appear to have enhanced AF compliance for JSOs competing BPZ for lieutenant colonel. In summary, if joint officer promotions fail to meet the expectations, AF must analyze why and then modify its overall management of joint officers to ensure compliance.

So what recommendations do we have? First, the exact promotion expectations comparisons need to be clarified. The 'as a group' comparison from the verbiage in 10 USC 662 is the root of the problem. The law provides that "Officers who have the joint specialty are expected, as a group, to be promoted at a rate not less than the rate for officers of the same grade and competitive category who are serving on, or have served on, the headquarters staff of the Air Force." So how should JSOs (officers who have the joint specialty) be measured?

JSOs vs. Headquarters Staff (as a group)

OR

JSOs vs. Headquarters Staff (serving-in), and

JSOs vs. Headquarters Staff (have-served)

The same holds true for the Joint Staff comparison where "Officers who are serving-in, or have served-in the Joint Staff are expected, as a group, to be promoted to the next higher grade at a rate not less than the rate for officers of the same grade and competitive category who are serving-in, or have served-in, the headquarters staff of the Air Force."

So which comparison is proper:

Joint Staff (as a group) vs. Headquarters Staff (as a group)

OR

Joint Staff (as a group) vs. Headquarters Staff (serving-in), and

Joint Staff (as a group) vs. Headquarters Staff (have-served)

OR

Joint Staff (serving-in) vs. Headquarters Staff (serving-in), and

Joint Staff (have-served) vs. Headquarters Staff (have-served)

In addition, the requirements of the law require the "Officers who are serving-in, or have served-in, joint duty assignments are expected, as a group, to be promoted to the next higher grade at a rate not less than the rate for all Air Force officers of the same grade and competitive category." So again, which comparison is appropriate?

Other Joint (as a group) vs. Service Average

OR

Other Joint (serving-in) vs. Service Average, and

Other Joint (have-served) vs. Service Average

This is significant when the reporting requirements (IAW 10 USC 662) direct SecDef to periodically report to Congress the rates of officers who are serving-in, or have served-in, joint duty assignments. The reporting of rates as a group is not mentioned. The annual report provision in 10 USC 667 only requires reporting of the serving-in percentages. It appears the exact requirements the Services are being held accountable for need to be clarified. Clear objectives are crucial to the planning and execution of the joint management program.

Another issue mentioned earlier which needs to be resolved is the management system to track the AF's progress in the management of joint officers. First, the level of progress in the attainment of joint promotion expectations should be reviewed not only by individual boards as they process through the AF, but also by joint rates by category. A MIS may need to be instituted for each AF action taken to improve the promotion of joint officers. For example, have the recent JSO designation selection procedures improved joint promotion rates? Leadership needs to know whether more changes are needed using an on-line or off-the-shelf management system. This system must maintain inter-connectivity between the promotion system and the other management areas: PME, assignments, and JSO designation. For example, AF has recently modified the assignment system; therefore, a tracking scheme, with indicators and predictors, needs to be established to measure the impact this new system will have on joint officer management.

So in the opinion of the researchers, specific requirements of the law need to be clarified and the AF should institute a more effective tracking system. Continued monitoring of promotion rates is essential to Title IV compliance. The AF should also carefully analyze the JDAL and RAND Corporation studies' results and make any necessary changes in joint management. Last, future study of the specific career areas may also be justified. It is clear the AF must remain vigilant in its management of joint officer promotions.

## **Chapter 5: Assignments**

As mentioned in the introduction, the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 establishes requirements for a joint officer management system to include education, assignment, promotion, and JSO designation. This chapter provides an overview of Title IV assignment mandates and AF compliance with those requirements. Specifically, this chapter covers the following mandates: 50 percent of JDA positions must be filled with JSO or JSO nominees; the SecDef must designate at least 1,000 critical JDAs which must be filled with JSOs; JSOs and a high proportion of other officers who graduate from a joint school must be immediately assigned to JDAs; and Congressionally established joint tour lengths. This chapter will also cover the requirement for SecDef to exclude joint training and Military Department assignments from joint duty consideration, and the requirement for SecDef to ensure a high quality of officers are assigned to JDA positions. In the case of the last requirement, this chapter will primarily focus on the assignment selection process for joint duty positions.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act requires SecDef to identify JDA positions to be managed by each Service and published in a JDAL.<sup>86</sup> Under the law, JDAs are positions in a multi-service/multi-national command or activity involved with the integrated employment or support of the land, sea, and air forces of at least two of the three Military Departments. Such involvement includes, but is not limited to, matters related to national military strategy; joint doctrine and policy; strategic planning; strategic and contingency planning; and, command and control of combat operations under a unified command.<sup>87</sup> It

excludes assignments for training, joint education, or performance with in-Service positions.<sup>88</sup>


Title IV requires 50 percent of all joint duty positions in grades above captain/Navy lieutenant be filled by officers who have been nominated or selected for the joint specialty.<sup>89</sup> Additionally, it directs SecDef to designate at least 1,000 critical joint duty assignments that must always be filled by fully qualified JSOs.<sup>90</sup> During initial implementation in 1987, SecDef designated over 8,000 JDA positions between the four Services, of which 1,000 were further designated as joint critical positions. Historically, the AF and the other Services have met the Congressional mandate to fill at least 50 percent of joint billets with JSOs or JSO nominees.<sup>91</sup> In fact, with the transition waiver provisions offered by Congress, the Services were able to establish a large JSO pool from which to fill the 50 percent and critical requirements.

In addition to meeting the 50 percent fill requirement, AF has also met Title IV's requirement to fill all joint critical billets with JSOs. Again, this was possible because of the large transition JSO pool, in addition to another transition provision which allowed the Services to maintain an 80 percent fill rate for these billets until 1 January 1994.<sup>92</sup> As stated in The Annual Report to Congress FY93, Appendix E, the AF exceeded the 80 percent requirement by an additional 6 percent.<sup>93</sup> Since 1 January 1994, the Service has met the 100 percent fill rate as required by the law for all critical billets.<sup>94</sup> At this point, it is important to note the AF personnel community took aggressive action to meet this Title IV mandate. Assignment officers were provided with specific written direction on procedures regarding assignment of JSOs to joint critical positions.<sup>95</sup> Of particular



note was establishment of a GO review prior to any assignment action involving joint critical positions.<sup>96</sup>

While the AF has met the JDA and joint critical mandates, the compliance may become more difficult in the future due to the size and composition of the JDAL. First, in the past 5 years, the AF has undergone a massive draw-down and over 3,600 of the 5,300 JSOs designated in the transition period have separated from the Service. As of March 1995, the AF has only 1,790 JSOs; a 66 percent decrease in 5 years. This, coupled with the size of the JDAL, which has remained relatively constant as the military force has drawn down, is making it more difficult for the Services to maintain a sufficient quantity and quality of officers to meet both Service and joint requirements.<sup>97</sup> Figure 3 shows the size and composition of the JDAL by Service since 1990.<sup>98</sup> As indicated, the AF continues to maintain a larger portion of the joint billets in comparison to the other Services. Consequently, the impact of the draw-down may have an even greater effect on the AF since they have a larger share of the joint requirement.



Source: Joint Staff, J-1, MMD

**Figure 3: JDAL Composition by Service**

Next, we will examine the requirement for "all joint specialty officers and a high portion of other officers who graduate from a joint school to be assigned immediately to a joint duty position."<sup>99</sup> Congress designated National Defense University (NDU), which includes National War College (NWC) and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF), as Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) schools.<sup>100</sup> Armed Forces Staff College, also a part of NDU, was designated as the JPME Phase II school.<sup>101</sup>

The law directs JSOs graduating from all joint PME must go to a joint duty assignment immediately following graduation unless waived by SecDef.<sup>102</sup> Additionally, SecDef must ensure better than 50 percent of the remaining graduates go to joint duty on their next assignment.<sup>103</sup> This portion of the law was amended in 1993 to read "... up to one-half of the required 50 percent of officers [needed] to fulfill the post-JPME requirements [can do so] during a second assignment following graduation."<sup>104</sup> According to the AFMPC staff, the AF has not implemented this provision because of cumbersome tracking procedures.<sup>105</sup>

In looking at AF compliance, we need to address two areas. First, whether AF has complied with the law, and secondly, whether there are potential problems in this area? In answer to the first issue, since 1988 the AF has met Title IV outplacement requirements with only minimal waivers. Of JSOs graduating from NWC and ICAF between CY88 and CY94, a SecDef waiver was only requested and received on five individuals to allow them to fill specific AF mission requirements. As for the 50 percent joint outplacement of non-JSO graduates, the AF met this requirement every year except 1990 when NWC outplacement missed the target by three individuals (18 of 41).<sup>106</sup>

While the AF has enjoyed reasonable success at meeting Title IV mandates, it has not been without some difficulty. This brings us to our next issue, Acquisition officer attendance at ICAF. Because a significant portion of the ICAF curriculum addresses subjects essential to an advanced study in Acquisition, ICAF was selected as the location for the Senior Acquisition Course (SAC). As with other career fields, Acquisition officers take the same course; however, they tailor their electives, writing projects, and additional classes to the Acquisition area.<sup>107</sup> By placing SAC at ICAF, the same 50 percent joint outplacement requirement levied on the other career specialties also applies to the Acquisition force. If these individuals are exempt from joint outplacement to meet Service Acquisition demands, then a greater percentage of the other career fields must go joint. In an effort to balance the needs of the Acquisition community with other career fields, the AF established a process whereby ICAF Acquisition officer assignments are worked on a case-by-case basis.<sup>108</sup> While not the optimum solution, it does attempt to minimize the impact of conflicting legislation.

As an alternative solution, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition and Technology, Acquisition, Education, Training and Career Development (OUSD (A&T)/AET & CD) has proposed a legislative change to Title 10, Chapter 38—Joint Officer Management, Section 663, to allow SecDef to “exclude from this provision military members of the Acquisition Corps, as defined in Section 1731 of this Code, who have graduated from the Senior Acquisition Course at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces if they are assigned to Critical Acquisition Positions . . . upon graduation.”<sup>109</sup> If adopted, it will give AF additional flexibility to assign Acquisition officers where they can best be utilized, without impacting outplacement requirements for other career fields.

In 1986, Title IV also mandated, subject to SecDef waiver, that joint duty tours be at least 3 years in length for G/FO and 3 1/2 years for other officers.<sup>110</sup> This requirement was amended in 1988 to read, "at least 2 years for general and flag officers and at least 3 years in length for other officers."<sup>111</sup> The only exceptions to the normal tours are: individuals, other than G/FOs, on their initial assignment in a COS; those electing retirement or separation; individuals relieved of duty 'for cause'; or individuals with a qualifying reassignment.<sup>112</sup> In terms of compliance, the AF has exceeded the requirement, for according to The Annual Report to Congress, FY93, AF officers averaged 39.7 months in a joint billet.<sup>113</sup>

Let us now look at the exceptions in more detail. For COS, the SecDef identified selected career fields from within the combat arms specialties in the case of the Army, or equivalent specialties in the case of the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. As codified in Title 10, Chapter 38, and outlined in DepSecDef's letter, 22 August 1988, "Equivalent specialties are those engaged in [the] operational art to attain strategic goals in a theater of conflict through the design, organization and conduct of campaigns and major operations. In addition, specialties among those meeting this definition and which are experiencing severe shortages of trained officers must be designated as COS."<sup>114</sup> Specific restrictions apply to COS provisions, such as: it only applies to an officer's initial joint duty assignment; officers must be nominated for the joint specialty prior to beginning the assignment; officers can be assigned without having completed JPME Phase I; limited adjustments to the average tour length can be made for COS officers (no more than 12 1/2 percent of all JDAs on the JDAL can be excluded in any year); a percentage of all critical billets are required to be filled by COS officers; and, COS provisions do not apply

to G/FOs. Within the AF, eligible career fields are: pilots, navigators, air weapons directors, missile operations, operations management, and space operations.<sup>115</sup> Another exception to the 36-month tour requirement is for individuals given a qualifying reassignment including: reassignment from a JDA for hardship, medical, or humanitarian reasons; movement to another JDA immediately after promotion because a position equal to the new grade does not exist; or the officer's billet is deleted because of reorganization.<sup>116</sup>

The final area that needs to be addressed concerns the provision of law granting cumulative or constructive credit. Cumulative credit, "... is service in joint duty assignments which totals in length no less than the applicable standard prescribed in a joint duty assignment that was performed outside the United States or in Alaska or Hawaii; or was terminated because of a qualifying reassignment as mentioned earlier." Unless it is a qualifying reassignment, cumulative credit may not be granted unless the member has served at least two years in the assignment.<sup>117</sup> As an exception, the FY88 NDAA did allow cumulative credit for certain officers who had completed multiple joint tours for purposes of promotion to G/FO or for award of the joint specialty. To qualify, the member had to have served in two or more JDAs with a total of three or more years, which included at least one tour of duty in a JDA performed outside the United States or in Alaska or Hawaii, or was terminated because of a qualifying reassignment.<sup>118</sup> Another exception to this policy was made for individuals who served in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Specifically, the FY93 NDAA included a provision for granting joint duty credit to officers in the Persian Gulf Combat Zone. This provision "... applies to any officer who after 1 August 1990, and before 1 October 1991 ...

provided significant experience in joint matters or involved frequent professional interaction. . . .” with other Services or allied forces.<sup>119</sup> The total of such joint assignments granted full credit under this policy may not exceed six percent of all JDA[s] at any time.<sup>120</sup> The AF conducted two separate boards to select officers for this joint duty credit, resulting in 114 officers receiving full credit and an additional 58 receiving partial credit.<sup>121</sup>

Constructive Credit is another provision of the law to enable the Service additional flexibility to reassign officers, who have not served the full joint duty tour, due to mission (Service) requirements. It can be granted to an officer, other than a G/FO, “. . . who, for reasons of military necessity, is reassigned from a joint duty assignment within 60 days of meeting the tour length. . . .”<sup>122</sup> Up to 60 days of credit can be given to allow the officer to meet the minimum necessary for joint credit. This provision does not apply to an officer who has served less than 10 months in the JDA. This portion of the law was further clarified by DepSecDef Memorandum, 19 June 1989, “. . . for reasons of military necessity (e.g., school report date or a change of command that cannot be delayed) . . . granting of constructive credit shall be limited to those cases in which other alternatives will not suffice to meet mission requirements.”<sup>123</sup> This provision has allowed the AF increased flexibility in meeting key mission requirements while still meeting the intent of Title IV. Of particular importance, it permits AF to do this without unduly penalizing the Service member.<sup>124</sup>

In addition to designating joint positions, determining JPME outplacement, and ensuring officers serve the mandated time in a joint billet, SecDef also has a responsibility to make sure joint training and Military Department assignments are excluded from JDA

consideration. There are provisions which allow for in-Service positions to be placed on the JDAL. First, Cross Departmental (CD) joint duty assignments are those where the officer serves full-time with another military department or with the armed forces of another nation. For the CD position to qualify as a JDA, the following provisions must be met: the position meets the definition of a JDA; the officer spends a significant amount of time involved in joint matters; the officer receives an official performance evaluation from the joint organization which becomes a permanent part of the officer's official personnel record; the officer is formally assigned to an authorized position outside of their own military department; and the position is documented on the JDAL as having been approved by SecDef.<sup>125</sup>

The second in-Service category is the Dual Hat (DH) joint duty assignment, which requires an officer to have responsibilities to both a Service and joint, combined, or international organization. They can only be considered JDAs if the following provisions are met: the applicable joint, combined, or international organization is listed on the JDAL as approved by the SecDef; the officer spends a significant amount of time involved in joint duties in meeting his/her responsibility to the joint, combined, or international activity; the officer receives an official performance evaluation from the joint organization that is included in the officer's official personnel records; the officer is formally assigned to an authorized billet in the joint, combined, or international activity; and the position is documented on the JDAL as having been approved by SecDef.<sup>126</sup>

Last, Jointly Manned Activities (JMA)s are organizations chartered by SecDef or CJCS as a JMA; have a single Service as executive agent; are a multi-department, multinational activity or element that performs a joint mission; reports operationally to a

unified or combined command or international organization; has a joint unit manning document managed by the executive agent, or multinational positions approved by JCS or SecDef; and positions within the JMA are distributed (normally not more than 60 percent for an single department) so Service responsibilities and influence appropriately reflect the mission assigned to the activity or element. Those individual billets which meet the definition of a JDA will be considered on a case-by-case basis for inclusion in the JDAL subject to the percentage limits for that organization, i.e., a JMA directly involved in joint planning or employment of joint forces is authorized to have up to 100 percent of its billets (major (O-4) and above) approved for JDA designation; a JMA which directly or indirectly supports joint forces are authorized to have no more than 50 percent of their major (O-4) and above billets as JDAs. This definition excludes those organizations, e.g., Service major commands, that are integral to a single military department as JMAs for joint assignment purposes.<sup>127</sup>

In 1989, several issues surfaced regarding CD, DH and JMA positions, most concerned whether the AF had any billets which met the requirements, and whether the AF was willing to transfer those positions to the control of another Service or joint agency. A review of the MAJCOM positions revealed that 432 positions met the defined criteria, of which 38 positions in the Tactical Air Command were identified for transfer. These positions were located at North American Aerospace Defense Command, United States Central Command-Air Forces, United States Southern Command-Air Forces, and Air Forces Iceland. Because these positions would have to be relinquished to the control of other Services or joint agencies and the AF could possibly lose control of missions and



resources, e.g., Air Liaison Officers and Tactical Air Liaison Officers, the majority of these billets were never transferred.<sup>128</sup>

The last provision of the law covered centers on the SecDef requirement "... to ensure that the qualifications of officers assigned to joint duty assignments are such that certain promotion rates will be achieved."<sup>129</sup> Since promotion compliance was addressed in Chapter 4, this chapter looks at the actual assignment process to determine if high quality officers are being assigned to joint duties. Three areas will be addressed: the GO review prior to assignment to a JDA; the Washington DC Tour Review, and the Officer Volunteer Assignment System (OVAS).

As stated in Chapter 4, AF missed mandated promotion targets leading to changes in the assignment selection process for joint duty. One of the most significant changes was the GO review of officers assigned to joint duty. This was highlighted in the following statement in a 9 October 1991 SecAF Letter to the CJCS regarding AF promotions, "... all assignments to joint duty will be approved personally by the general officer responsible for directing assignments for the Air Force."<sup>130</sup> This initiative was implemented in late 1991 as the result of AF's failure to meet Title IV promotion comparisons for several consecutive boards. The assignment selection process incorporated an officer selection record assessment to determine joint suitability and a GO approval of the assignment action. In 1991, when this assignment process was approved, the AFMPC/DPMR was a GO and assumed responsibility for this review; however, once the AFMPC/DPMR position was downgraded to a colonel (O-6) billet, the reviews were staffed to the AFMPC Commander or Vice Commander for approval. In 1994, joint assignment approval for 'good' assessments, PME graduates, JSOs and extensions for

non-IPZ officers was delegated to AFMPC/DPMR. Approval for all other joint assignments was maintained at the GO level.<sup>131</sup>

Although it may be premature to fully assess the long-term impact of this assignment selection review, there is sufficient data to support that AF has significantly improved the quality of those officers assigned to joint duty—quality measured by the increased number of BPZ and resident PME graduates assigned to joint duty, which should eventually lead to a higher quality JSO pool. This improvement may not be entirely the result of the GO review; however, it does appear that the review was definitely a contributing factor.

A review of the of BPZ pilot population entering joint duty from 1988 through 1994 shows that AF increased the number of BPZ pilots from a mere 14 percent in 1988, to 38.8 percent in 1994. The most significant increase occurred between 1993 and 1994, about two years after implementation of the GO review, when the rate of BPZ pilots spiked from 26.8 percent to 38.8—a 12 percent increase. Similar increases occurred for navigators and non-rated line officers; however, not at the same rapid pace. In 1988, only 9.2 percent of navigators and 11.6 percent of non-rated line officers assigned to joint duty were BPZ promotees, compared to 16.4 for navigators and 20.9 percent for non-rated line in 1994.<sup>132</sup> Figure 4 clearly shows the increased numbers of BPZ officers entering joint duty from 1988-1994.

A similar increase exists for resident PME graduates outplaced to joint duty. An analysis of 1988 resident PME graduates shows that only 23 percent of ISS and 24 percent of SSS graduates were outplaced to joint duty. This compares to 31 and 42 percent for ISS and SSS, respectively, for 1994. However, what is interesting

regarding PME outplacement is it was not a gradual improvement process. Each year there was a notable increase or decrease in officers outplaced to joint duty. The researchers could not isolate one specific factor which contributed to this cycle; however, there appears to be a correlation between AF loss numbers generated by voluntary and involuntary draw-down programs, which may have generated an increased availability of joint positions for resident PME graduates. The highest AF losses were noted in 1992; similarly there was a 34 percent increase in the number of officers entering joint duty for that same year. There was a significant increase in joint outplacement in 1991, followed by decreases in 1992 and 1993. As the great 'influx' of 1992 complete joint tours in 1994 and 1995, there should be a corresponding increase in PME outplacement. The 1994 data supports this assumption, because SSS outplacement doubled and ISS increased by six percent. It is too early to analyze 1995 data to determine whether it follows this trend. In analyzing this cycle, the reader should keep in mind there is lag time between graduation and assignment to a joint organization due to enroute training, e.g., AFSC. Figure 5 depicts PME outplacement data for 1988-1994.<sup>133</sup>

As stated above, it is too early to assess the long-term impact of AF's efforts to increase the quality of officers assigned to joint duty. However, in the view of the researchers, there appears to be some healthy trends, e.g., improved promotion statistics, to support that their efforts will have positive, long-term results. Unfortunately, it is difficult to isolate what specific initiatives have the greatest return, especially in a time of force draw-down and restructure. Last, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to measure the impact of leadership emphasis on joint officer management.

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